Quantum Measurements Are Noncontextual by Griffiths, Robert B.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
2.
50
52
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  4
 Ju
n 2
01
3
Quantum Measurements are Noncontextual
Robert B. Griffiths ∗
Department of Physics, Carnegie-Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
Version of 24 April 2013
Abstract
Quantum measurements are noncontextual, with outcomes independent of which other commuting
observables are measured at the same time, when consistently analyzed using principles of Hilbert space
quantum mechanics rather than classical hidden variables.
John Bell in Sec. 5 of [1] while discussing hidden variables in quantum mechanics raised the question of
whether quantum theory is “contextual.” In particular, does the outcome of a measurement of an observable
A on a system S depend on whether A is measured along with an observable B that commutes with A, or
along with a different observable C that also commutes with A but does not commute with B? (In what
follows we make no distinction between an observable A and the operator A = A† that represents it on
the Hilbert space HS of the system in question.) Everyone agrees that if two observables commute they
can be measured simultaneously, so there is no difficulty imagining A and B measured simultaneously on a
single system using a single apparatus. Similarly one can imagine A and C measured simultaneously by a
single apparatus, but since B and C do not commute, the two apparatuses just mentioned must be different.
Suppose the first apparatus yields some value of A. Would the second have yielded the same result? A
theory which answers “Yes” is said to be noncontextual ; one which answers “No” is contextual, i.e., the
measurement outcome depends on the context, on what else is being measured at the same time. Note
that the issue being addressed here is that of individual measurement outcomes, not the probability of an
outcome in a situation where measurements may be repeated a large number of times.
It will be argued below that quantum theory is noncontextual : the measured value of A does not depend
on which other observable, necessarily one commuting with A, is measured simultaneously with it, assuming
the measurement is carried out with properly designed apparatus. The basic point is that the outcome of
such a measurement can be interpreted as revealing a property that the measured system—we refer to it
as a particle—had before the measurement took place. By a quantum property we mean (following von
Neumann, see Sec. III.5 of [2]) something represented by a subspace of the appropriate quantum Hilbert
space, equivalently the projector onto this subspace, rather than by some additional hidden variable that
is not part of the Hilbert space. The techniques needed for this analysis have been available for well over
a decade [3, 4], but seem to have been ignored in a substantial collection of papers—the number is large,
and what follows is far from an exhaustive list—published relatively recently in this [5–14] and in other
journals [15–28]. (Some older discussions of the contextuality problem in [29] and in Ch. 7 of [30] are in
certain respects clearer than Bell’s original work. The philosopher’s perspective is well represented in [31]
and [32].) These papers leave the reader with the misleading (in our opinion) impression that quantum
mechanics is contextual because it fails to satisfy certain inequalities derived on the basis of classical hidden
variable theories. We believe that, on the contrary, the real issue is that quantum mechanics is not classical
mechanics, and when analyzed using conceptual tools consistent with its mathematical (Hilbert space)
structure quantum mechanics is noncontextual, using this term in the sense originally employed by Bell.
Textbook quantum theory cannot address Bell’s question for reasons Bell himself pointed out in one of
his last publications [33]: it employs “measurement” as a sort of fundamental principle or axiom, a black
box which cannot be opened or further analyzed. This is the great “measurement problem” of quantum
foundations, which in fact is two problems. The first is that the unitary time development produced by
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Schro¨dinger’s equation when applied to the apparatus as well as the system being measured can lead to a
superposition of outputs—pointer positions in the quaint but picturesque language of quantum foundations—
which is hard to interpret. Disposing of this “Schro¨dinger cat,” or, speaking metaphorically, stopping the
pointer from wiggling, constitutes the first measurement problem. But when this has been solved the second
measurement problem remains: inferring from the macroscopic pointer position some microscopic state of
affairs that existed before, not after, the measurement took place. Such inferences are frequently carried out
by experimental physicists: think of a neutrino coming from the sun, or a gamma ray emerging from a nucleus
and gobbled up by a detector. The widespread idea that a quantum measurement only tells one something
about what exists after the measurement is complete arises from an inadequate treatment in textbooks, in
which a measurement is often confused with the preparation of a system in a particular quantum state. The
two are not unrelated, but they are in fact distinct; see [34] for further discussions of this point.
The consistent or decoherent histories approach, hereafter referred to as “histories,” seems at present the
only interpretation of quantum mechanics employing the quantum Hilbert space without using additional
hidden variables that gives satisfactory answers to both measurement problems. It is the basis of the
analysis that follows. There are by now numerous expositions of the basic histories approach; in order
of decreasing length we recommend the following: [4, 35–37]. There have been numerous criticisms; for
an analysis of, and response to the major ones the reader is referred to [34] and other work cited there.
Its proponents do not regard the histories approach as antithetical to standard quantum mechanics as
found in textbooks. It predicts exactly the same probabilities for measurement outcomes, but in addition
it allows measurements themselves to be analyzed in fully quantum mechanical terms, and in particular
the outcomes of measurements to be related to the microscopic properties the apparatus was designed to
measure. The following discussion should for the most part be accessible to readers familiar only with the
standard (textbook) approach, though at certain points reference is made to published results in order to
shorten a longer discussion. A more detailed but also more abstract and less physical approach to the issue
of contextuality will be found in [38].
Rather than discussing abstract principles, let us consider a specific example in which HS is three
dimensional (think of the spin of a spin-one particle, though angular momentum does not enter the following
discussion), with an orthonormal basis |1〉, |2〉, |3〉, and three different observables defined as follows using
dyads:
A = |1〉〈1| − |2〉〈2| − |3〉〈3|, B = 1
2
|1〉〈1|+ |2〉〈2| − |3〉〈3|, C = 2|1〉〈1|+ |2〉〈3|+ |3〉〈2|. (1)
It is obvious that [A,B] = 0, and straightforward to show that [A,C] = 0 and [B,C] 6= 0.
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Figure 1: Apparatus to measure A along with B (U = UB), or with C (U = UC).
An apparatus for measuring these observables is shown schematically in Fig. 1. The incoming particle
first passes through a device V (one can think of an electric field gradient acting on a particle with an
electric quadrupole moment) which splits the path in two: the upper path, followed by a particle in the
state |1〉, leads to the detector D1. The lower (straight) path, followed by a particle whose state is any
linear combination of |2〉 and |3〉, passes through a nondestructive detector M1 that measures the particle’s
passage without disturbing its internal state, and then through another device U that carries out a unitary
transformation UB equal to the identity I (i.e, the device does nothing) if B is to be measured, or
UC = (1/
√
2)
{|2〉〈2|+ |2〉〈3|+ |3〉〈2| − |3〉〈3|}. (2)
if C is to be measured. Following this yet another device W (e.g., think of a Stern-Gerlach magnet) splits
the trajectory into one moving upwards if the particle state is in state |2〉, or downwards if it is in state |3〉;
these terminate in detectors D2 and D3.
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A particle initially in the eigenstate |1〉 of A with eigenvalue +1 will be detected by D1, whereas any
eigenstate with eigenvalue −1, some linear combination of |2〉 and |3〉, will be detected byM1 and then travel
on. Thus a measurement of A precedes the particle’s passing through the box U , and the outcome will not
be affected by whether the unitary is UB or UC . Which of these is present could, in principle, be decided at
the very last moment, after the particle (if on this path) has passed through M1. A measurement of B is
carried out by setting U = I, so that initial eigenstates with eigenvalues of 1/2, 1, and −1 will be detected
by detectors 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Alternatively, C can be measured by setting U = UC , (2); eigenvalues
of 2, 1, and −1 correspond to detection by detectors 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
But suppose the incoming particle has been prepared in a state |ψ0〉 which is not an eigenstate of the
operators which will later be measured. How can one avoid Schro¨dinger’s cat, if the detectors themselves
are quantum devices, as assumed by most physicists nowadays? The cleanest way to resolve this (first)
measurement problem is to employ Born’s idea [39] that a quantum wave function evolving unitarily in time
is not to be regarded as physical reality, but instead interpreted using probabilities—the wave function is a
“pre-probability” in the notation of Ch. 9 of [4]. The modern approach is to set up a suitable framework,
a collection of quantum histories in which the ordinary macroscopic outcome results for the detectors are
represented by appropriate (“quasi-classical”) projectors on the full quantum Hilbert space of particle-plus-
measuring apparatus. For details, see [4], in particular Chs. 17 and 18.
It is, of course, clear given the construction shown in Fig. 1 that if the change from an A-plus-B apparatus
to an A-plus-C apparatus is made after the particle has passed the position of detectors D1 and M1, this
cannot affect the A measurement outcome, at least if the future does not influence the past, so in this sense
it seems clear that this measurement is noncontextual.1However, this might leave open the possibility that in
some other measurement setup the measurement of C instead of B would affect the A measurement outcome.
In order to dispose of this concern we need to address the second measurement problem and show that the
outcome of the A measurement reflects a property possessed by the particle before the measurement took
place, and this is true (for a properly constructed apparatus) whatever state |ψ0〉 the particle is initially
prepared in.
Let t1 be a time just before the particle reaches the measuring device, e.g., before it enters the V box in
Fig. 1, and assume that its unitary time evolution (it is traveling in a field-free region) from t0, when initially
prepared, to t1 is trivial: |ψ1〉 = |ψ0〉. At time t1 introduce a projective decomposition of the identity on
HS ,
I = |1〉〈1|+
(
|2〉〈2|+ |3〉〈3|
)
= P1 + P2 (3)
and consider a family of four histories at times t0 < t1 < t2,
[Ψ0]⊙ {P1, P2} ⊙ {D1,M1}. (4)
Here [Ψ0] = |Ψ0〉〈Ψ0| is the projector corresponding to a state |Ψ0〉 at t0 which is a tensor product of an
initial apparatus state with the particle state |ψ0〉;2 P1 and P2 are projectors on the particle properties
defined in (3), understood to be tensored with the identity operator on the apparatus Hilbert space; and at a
time t2, after the measurement is complete, D1 andM1 are projectors corresponding to the two macroscopic
outcomes. Here⊙ is a tensor product symbol, but for present purposes it can simply be regarded as separating
events at different times. The first of the four histories, [Ψ0]⊙ P1 ⊙D1, has the physical interpretation that
the particle was in state |1〉 at time t1, and at time t2 detector D1 has registered its arrival. The other three
possibilities, with P2 replacing P1 or M1 replacing D1, are interpreted in a similar way.
A relatively straightforward probabilistic analysis—for details, see the examples in [35] or Chs. 17 and
18 of [4]—of this family of histories yields, in the case of a properly constructed measurement apparatus,
conditional probabilities
Pr(P1 |D1) = 1; Pr(P2 |M1) = 1. (5)
In words, if at time t2 detector D1 has detected the particle, then one is certain (probability 1) that at
time t1 the particle had the property P1, i.e., the value of A was +1, whereas if the particle’s passage was
1A referee raised the issue of whether the future not influencing the past could be part of a “classical intuition” inconsistent
with quantum mechanics. There is no evidence to suggest that histories quantum mechanics violates the second law of ther-
modynamics, though the subject needs further investigation; see Sec. 8.4.3 of [34]. Even in classical statistical mechanics there
is no really satisfactory derivation of the second law from microscopic dynamics, so no precise proof that the future does not
influence the past.
2The preparation apparatus could also be included, but this adds nothing but a slight complication to the following discussion
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indicated by M1 then it is certain that at time t1 it had the property P2 and the value of A was −1. One
can regard (5) as constituting an essential feature of what one means by a competently designed and built
apparatus for measuring A, whether or not it takes the form shown schematically in Fig. 1: the macroscopic
outcome must be able to reveal the prior microscopic state.
By contrast, the assumption made implicitly in textbooks is that in place of P1 and P2 one should at
time t1 use the projective decomposition
I = |ψ1〉〈ψ1|+
(
I − |ψ1〉〈ψ1|
)
= Q1 +Q2, (6)
where Q1 corresponds to unitary time development of the particle state and Q2 to its negation. There is
nothing wrong with this choice. However, in general Q1 and Q2 will not commute with the projectors P1 and
P2 needed to discuss the microscopic properties the apparatus was designed to measure. There is no way of
consistently combining noncommuting projectors in a meaningful quantum description; pretending that this
is possible leads to paradoxes. The choice between {Q1, Q2} and {P1, P2} at the intermediate time depends
on whether one wishes to relate the properties of the particle at this time to its earlier preparation or to
the outcome of a later measurement.3 This does not at all imply that the property at the time t1 depends
in any causal sense on which future measurement the particle might undergo; for more on this topic see
Sec. 14.4 of [4] (where, the reader should be warned, the term ‘contextual’ is used in a sense different from
that employed by Bell and used in the present Letter). For additional discussion of the issue of incompatible
frameworks and why they cannot be combined (the single framework rule) see [34], and for specific examples
see Sec. 4.6 of [4], and [35].
The preceding discussion for a particle with three states is easily generalized to the case of an arbitrary
(finite) number of states. To see this, let {Pα} be the projective decomposition which diagonalizes A in the
sense that the eigenvalues in
A =
∑
α
aαPα (7)
are distinct: aα 6= aα′ when α 6= α′. Then it is straightforward to show that if A commutes with B, every
Pα in (7) also commutes with B. That is, if a basis is chosen such that the matrix of A is diagonal with
identical eigenvalues placed in separate blocks, the corresponding matrix of B is block diagonal, and each
of its blocks can be separately diagonalized by a change of basis that leaves the A matrix unchanged. The
same comment applies to any other observable C that commutes with A, whether or not it commutes with
B, though of course the bases used to diagonalize B and to diagonalize C must be different if [B,C] 6= 0.
A measuring apparatus similar to that in Fig. 1 can be constructed by first separating the incoming
particle trajectory into different paths corresponding to the different Pα (thus different aα values) in (7),
and then using nondestructive measurement devices (like M1 in Fig. 1) to detect which path the particle
is moving along without affecting its internal state. Following this, on each path install an appropriate
unitary, which will in general be different depending on whether one wishes to measure B or C, and after
each unitary a device to produce a further separation of paths directed into the final detectors. Since the A
measurement can be made in advance of either B or C, it is evident that this apparatus design provides a
noncontextual measurement. A histories analysis analogous to that given in (3) to (5) then shows that this
result is completely general and applies to any apparatus properly designed and constructed to accurately
measure A together with (or without) any other observable that commutes with A. The measurement is
noncontextual, for the outcome reveals a property the particle possessed before the measurement began.
It is this link between a measurement outcome and a property of the measured system before the mea-
surement took place that demonstrates that in quantum theory the measurement process is noncontextual.
So why is it that one so often hears the contrary? A number of reasons come to mind. First, measurements
are inadequately treated in textbooks; one admires authors (e.g., [40, 41]) who are brave enough to concur
publicly with Bell [33]: here is a problem they have not been able to resolve. But of course without some, at
least implicit, theory of quantum measurements one cannot even begin to discuss contextuality. Second, in
attempting to fill this serious gap in standard (textbook) quantum mechanics it has been assumed by Bell
and many others that microscopic properties might be represented not by Hilbert subspaces, but by hidden
variables which are in certain essential respects classical. This is obvious in the best-known hidden variable
3A referee has asked what happens if at a later time Q1 and Q2 are measured rather than P1 and P2. If the Qj and Pj do
not commute this cannot be done in a single experimental run. One can ask the counterfactual question of what would have
happened if the Qj had been measured instead of the Pj . Quantum counterfactuals are discussed in detail in Ch. 19 of [4] and
applied to Hardy’s paradox in Ch. 25. Again, there is no indication that the future influences the past.
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approach, the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave [42, 43], where the particle is assumed to have a well-defined
position at all times. The hidden variables approach seems almost inevitably to lead to the conclusion that
quantum mechanics is infested with nonlocal influences, and the choice of a measurement at some spacelike
separated point can influence what is going on here, a “contextual” influence. If one uses the histories
approach based on a proper Hilbert space analysis with no hidden variables such nonlocality disappears; see
the discussion in [44], and in a more pedagogical form in [35], and with it any notion that violations of Bell
inequalities support the idea of quantum contextuality.
Third, the Bell-Kochen-Specker (BKS) result, see e.g. [29], is often invoked as grounds for contextuality.
For details of the analysis showing that BKS does not imply contextuality we refer the reader to Ch. 22
in [4], to the discussion in Sec. 5 of [38] referring to the concept of “realism” as presented in [32], and to
earlier work in [45]. To put the matter briefly, BKS is perfectly fine as a mathematical theorem. However,
the collections of Hilbert-space projectors used to construct a BKS paradox do not commute with each
other, and hence cannot all be used together in a single consistent quantum description of a physical state
of affairs; in histories terminology the single framework rule is violated. What BKS is telling us is not that
quantum measurements are contextual, but that the textbook treatment of measurements is inadequate for
understanding the quantum world.
In summary, decades of research have shown that trying to understand quantum mechanics using hidden
variables always leads sooner or later to serious conceptual problems such as a peculiar action-at-a-distance
inconsistent with special relativity. Or to measurement contextuality, which, were it true, would seriously
undermine confidence in experimental results. By contrast, a consistent Hilbert space approach, with quan-
tum properties represented by Hilbert subspaces, is internally consistent, paradox free (so far as we know
at present), and applies without exception to systems of arbitrary size and complexity. Students are taught
that they cannot always write XY = Y X in quantum physics, even in cases where this is perfectly fine
in classical physics; one must pay attention to whether operators commute. They need to learn the corre-
sponding rules for reasoning consistently about quantum properties, and not simply be told “Shut up and
calculate; quantum mechanics only predicts outcomes of measurements.” They don’t believe it, and they
shouldn’t.
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